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Abstract 
 
This special report presents the results of the research project on Adequacy and 
Sustainability of Old-Age Income in the EU (AIM). This collaborative effort of 13 
research institutes from across the EU, led by the Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS), was financed by the 6
th Framework Programme and lasted three and half 
years. It concluded with a final conference in October 2008, featuring a keynote 
speech by Vladimir Spidla, EU Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities. 
The project has been able to highlight the differences among EU member states when 
it comes to saving for retirement. While in some countries the working age 
population is able to sustain their consumption on retirement, in others there is a 
significant saving gap.  
AIM also provided new, detailed statistics on the socio-economic situation of the 
elderly in the EU, developed scenarios for the future and described the key concepts 
and analytical tools available to policy-makers. 
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HOW TO MAKE EUROPEAN PENSIONS 
ADEQUATE AND SUSTAINABLE? 
CEPS Special Report/March 2009 
JURAJ DRAXLER
* 
Where does Europe stand today on pension benefits? 
Europeans worry about their pension benefits.
1 They also resist reforms.
2 Attempts to raise the 
retirement age, in particular, are universally unpopular.
3  
Still, in the 1990s, the policy arena fully awoke to the problem of demographic ageing. 
Governments started introducing parametric reforms aimed at improving the long-term 
sustainability of public finances. Some even managed to comprehensively overhaul their 
pension systems (Sweden and most of the new member states).  
So, what new is there to say about pension reform design? 
First, the recent reforms provide valuable material for policy learning. We can assess the results 
against the initial expectations, draw conclusions about the preparation and implementation of 
reforms. Secondly, academics have continued to develop analytical tools. Some of the 
approaches introduced in the 1990s, such as option value models,
4 have been refined and new 
simulation techniques developed. And, thirdly, we have more data – on income positions, on 
attitudes to reform options, on health and productivity patterns – and we can therefore assess 
with greater accuracy the needs and demands of various stakeholder groups.  
The European dimension  
This study is based (comparatively and in term of generalisations) on the EU perspective. While 
social policy continues to be very much under the control of the individual member states, the 
EU dimension is increasingly important. Some regulation of pension investment is provided 
under the common market principle.
5 Also, some aspects of the portability of pension rights are 
dealt with at the EU level.
6  
And, finally, the European stage is also important for comparing practices,
7 for mutual learning 
and for pooling resources. For instance, microsimulation models, arguably the key quantitative 
                                                      
* Juraj Draxler is Associate Research Fellow at CEPS. He can be contacted at juraj.draxler@ext.ceps.eu. 
1 See European Commission (2008).  
2 See Boeri (2004). 
3 See Kohl (2003). 
4 See Belloni (2008). 
5 A typical example is Directive 2003/41/EC on the activities and supervision of institutions for 
occupational retirement provision (IORPs), which was adopted in June 2003.  
6 While the portability of pension rights accrued in publicly administered systems has been well provided 
for for some time, the recent attempts by the Commission to provide the same for occupational pensions, 
in the form of the directive proposed in October 2005 and amended in October 2007, have apparently 
somewhat stalled (the amended directive proposal can be retrieved at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/docs/social_protection/2007/com_2007_0603_en.pdf ). 
7 See Natali (2007). 2 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
tool needed to assess individual adequacy of pension provision, have traditionally been built at 
the national level. The European Commission has now organised a project, PENMICRO, that 
will list the key microsimulation models and their technical properties.
8 Another example would 
be the SHARE project,
9 which maps the health situation in the population above 50, and is thus 
crucial for assessing the productive capacities of the elderly, something we are now able to 
largely glean only from labour market data. 
The European Commission has also funded some large-scale projects dealing comprehensively 
with the economics of ageing. The following text draws heavily on the project on Adequacy and 
Sustainability of Old-Age Income Maintenance (AIM).
10  
Key problem: Balancing sustainability and adequacy 
Age-related expenditure is bound to rise in the future, as populations become older. The effect 
will be compounded by the retirement of the baby-boom generation in roughly the years 2020-
40. After 2020, increments to growth will have to come from productivity increases (unless the 
EU experiences massive inflows of migrants).
11  
It is easy to see that this will influence provisions for retirement. But assessing the effect with 
any precision and comparing how different countries will be affected is no mean feat.
12 
However, we now have projections that allow us to comprehensively assess the sustainability of 
the consumption of cohorts in certain countries, and compare it, on a methodologically robust 
basis, with the consumption in other countries. 
A paper produced by the UK’s National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR)
13 
shows that the consumption patterns of 20-year olds in some major EU economies are 
unsustainable. In the countries surveyed – France, Italy, Spain and the UK – this cohort needs to 
substantially increase its savings rate (ranging from an increase of 6% in France to 10% in Italy) 
to be able to finance itself through the life-cycle.  
The picture is not quite as dramatic when one looks at the entire current working population, 
given the historically high savings in these countries. France and Spain are practically able to 
afford current spending. Italy, although a high saver in the past, cannot afford its current 
consumption and would need to decrease it by around 5%. The biggest savings gap of the 
countries surveyed is to be found in the UK, which has had low savings rates and which would 
need to decrease working population consumption by around 7%.  
Even though simple fiscal projections in the past have drawn attention to ageing as a problem of 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems, more comprehensive data as presented here allow us to see the 
effect of ageing irrespective of the pension system. In fact, as we have just seen, the UK, relying 
on a significant funded component, has been a major dis-saver. 
At a microeconomic level, this partial shift of attention to comprehensive old-age income rather 
than relying solely on the standard labour income replacement rates has led to the construction 
of a new tool – comprehensive replacement rates (COREs). This measure defines disposable 
                                                      
8 Project website: http://www.tarki.hu/en/projects/intergen/index.html#penmicro.  
9 Project website: www.share-project.org  
10 Project website: www.enepri.org/Aim  
11 See Carone et al. (2005). 
12 The Ageing Working Group (AWG) 2005 exercise mandated by the Economic Policy Committee has 
relied on individual national projections of pension expenditure.  
13 This research was part of the AIM project (see Weale & Khoman, 2008).  HOW TO MAKE EUROPEAN PENSIONS ADEQUATE AND SUSTAINABLE? | 3 
 
income in a broad way, including pension income from public and private schemes, income 
from work, unemployment, disability, survivor, housing and other social benefits.
14  
Such a measure allows us to better understand the income positions of various groups of the 
elderly. Efforts in recent years have also led to enhanced datasets that tell us how European 
pensioners live, by various subgroups.
15 
We need such detailed datasets, particularly, to continue monitoring pension adequacy. While 
the main problem discussed in the policy sphere in the past decade or so has been sustainability, 
publics also insist that pensions remain adequate.  
Adequacy is a controversial term - it is difficult to base on a single, universally accepted 
measurement. Also, public pension schemes, as components of larger welfare regimes, have 
sprung from different objectives. In some cases, the original aim was simply to prevent people 
from falling into poverty. In others, pension schemes were intended to help individuals maintain 
their lifestyle and social position.
16  
However, it has come to be generally accepted in the policy sphere that adequate pensions 
should have both a poverty-preventing and a consumption-smoothing function, while 
maintaining a compact between generations.
17 
While pensions that are overly generous are economically unsustainable, those that fail to 
provide for the three basic objectives are politically unsustainable.  
Decision-makers should therefore be aware of the full range of options available to them when 
reforming pension systems. They should focus on objectives rather than on narrow, specific 
components of the pension systems. Also, being aware of the full range of options makes it 
possible to debate and implement a consensus-based pension mix that can provide long-term 
political and economic sustainability. 
The basics of pension scheme design 
Besides the retirement age, there are four main parameters of pension systems whose 
combination ultimately determines the pension payout: 
•  The pension formula/rules of accrual 
•  Portability (transferability) of pension rights 
•  Vesting (eligibility) rules 
•  Indexation of benefits 
                                                      
14 See Borella & Fornero (2009).  
15 The AIM project featured two such extensive studies. One is Jehoel-Gijsbers & Vrooman (2008). The 
other, focusing in more detail on the New Member States, is Vrooman et al. (2008). 
16 It is a fairly well-established fact that when pension saving is not obligatory, people are do not save 
enough. Or, if they have the option to opt out or even avoid contributions, they do so. In justifying 
mandatory pension systems, the literature generally focuses on the inability of individuals to predict their 
needs or to take multiple decisions leading to the preparation for retirement. A less dictatorial, game-
theoretic explanation is also possible. Individuals are competing to achieve a certain standard of living. If, 
given the very long horizons and uncertainty involved, only a few save and most do not, the dis-savers 
may suppose to be at the end assisted through some collective action (or simply ignore the individual 
preparation due to too much uncertainty).  
17 The AIM project produced a paper on constructing quantifiers of adequacy (see Abatemarco, 2009). 4 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
A typical distinction made is between defined-benefit (DB) and defined-contribution (DC) 
pension formulas. A DB-type formula sets pensions at some contractually pre-determined level, 
either as a concrete amount or, more likely, as a ratio to salary. Typically this is to the final 
salary or as an average of salaries in the final years of employment (for the so-called ‘final-pay 
benefit schemes’). In contrast, the schemes that are defined-contribution provide benefits that 
are directly related to the amount of contributions made to the scheme – multiplied by the rate 
of return (in funded schemes, i.e. schemes where assets are invested in the financial market) or 
by an index linked to economic growth (in non-funded schemes). There are many variations of 
either the DB and or the DC formula. For example, an average-pay scheme links benefits to 
average pay throughout the whole career, and is thus a combination of the DB and DC 
principles.  
The portability of pension rights is a particular problem for occupational pensions. Indeed, one 
of the original aims of occupational pensions has been to ensure the loyalty of employees to the 
employer/plan sponsor. This becomes a problem in modern economies where individuals 
change jobs more frequently than in the past. Particularly in the UK, which has a plethora of 
occupational schemes (as contrasted to the situation in the Netherlands, where several sector-
based schemes dominate), savers can still lose a substantial portion of pension rights 
transferring from one scheme to another.
18 The problem of portability is, of course, compounded 
by the existence of national boundaries and is conceivably affecting labour force mobility in the 
common market.  
A pension scheme typically requires a certain minimum vesting period (a period after which one 
becomes eligible for benefits). Variations include phased vesting, where one first becomes 
entitled to only a part of the benefit and then in stages earns the full-entitlement. 
Of course, benefit indexation also plays a role. It is still not uncommon for indexation to be 
decided purely through a vote in the parliament every year or every few years. Pensions can be 
indexed to wages or prices level. Long-term wage-indexation is considered risky for public 
finances – once baby boomers start exiting the labour market, the relative scarcity of labour 
should cause a sharp rise in wage levels. A compromise between price-indexation (a good 
measure of cost of living but not of relative income position) and wage indexation is found in 
the so-called ‘Swiss indexation’: 50% wages and 50% prices.
19  
Of course, other factors can directly influence pension income, for example the way countries 
treat taxation of old-age benefits (in some cases, these are taxed, in others, not). But in terms of 
the basics of the pension scheme itself, the list just presented sums up the dimensions along 
which policy-makers are able to move in terms of determining payout.   
The other side of the coin, of course, is how pensions are financed. The typical dichotomy used 
is between pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems (where current pensions are financed through 
continuous redistribution of current contributions) and funded systems (where assets are 
invested in the financial markets).  This dichotomy, it needs to be said, is probably exaggerated 
in public debates. The choice is not between PAYG and funded systems, but between various 
types of PAYG and funded schemes. The Swedish notional defined contribution system (NDC) 
combines PAYG financing (that is, financing from current contributions) with the principle of 
individual defined-contribution accounts. On the other hand, while funded schemes are often 
associated with individual accounts, this is by no means the only option. Assets can be pooled, 
                                                      
18 A detailed overview of the UK pension system is provided by Blake (2003).  
19 A further technical detail concerns the question of whether to index to the average wage or to the total 
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and payout adjusted to long-term returns. This provides a smoothing mechanism and takes away 
some of the risk of exposure of the individual to sudden downturns in the stock market.  
Lastly, pension systems can be privately or publicly managed, voluntary or mandatory.
20  
The taxonomy of pension systems, incidentally, can be quite confusing. Central and Eastern 
Europe, which has relied on World Bank expertise, uses the World Bank three-pillar 
classification: the first pillar being the public PAYG schemes, second pillar compulsory funded 
schemes and the third pillar voluntary funded schemes. This classification is often used in other 
countries too and now clashes with the previously widespread OECD classification, which has 
traditionally also been used in EU documents.
21 
Apart from adjusting the above-mentioned economic parameters, governments can improve the 
fiscal sustainability of pension systems, particularly of the defined-benefit ones, by 
manipulating the effective retirement age. Evidence shows that people react strongly to financial 
incentives.
22 Apart from raising the statutory retirement age, effective retirement age can be 
increased by discouraging early retirement by  
•  applying actuarial reductions to pensions for those who retire early, and premiums in the 
case of those who continue working beyond the statutory age, 
•  restricting (or completely abolishing) access to early retirement schemes and 
•  restricting access to various incapacity schemes. 
In fact, as we will see in the next section, closing off pathways to early retirement has been one 
of the main reform movements in the EU.  
The labour market matters too 
Of course, pension income is a function of both the pension system and the conditions in the 
labour market. The conditions that affect the pension benefit include: 
•  overall labour market income of a person over his lifetime,  
•  the income profile of an individual over her life-cycle in the labour market,  
•  continuity and discontinuity of labour market participation (i.e. gaps between spells of 
work, which can have a dramatic impact on DC systems),  
•  labour market demand (also in a narrow sense, for example employability of older workers) 
and 
•  regulation of the right to be employed and active labour market policies.  
The many issues related to the performance of the labour market and its impact on old-age 
income include the need to provide unisex mortality tables, which prove to be the most effective 
tool for making up for the scattered career profile of women, due to their child-bearing and 
caring responsibilities.
23  
                                                      
20 The AIM project provided an overview or EU pension regimes in Soede & Vrooman (2008). For an 
earlier discussion on classifying pension regimes, see Rhodes & Natali (2003). 
21 These taxonomic questions are extensively discussed in Yermo (2002).  
22 See Gruber & Wise (2004). The AIM project surveyed the reaction of workers to incentives 
comprehensively in Piekkola (2009). Other studies in the project looked in more detail at specific 
countries, and can be found through the project’s website (www.enepri.org/Aim).   
23 The AIM project looked at the effect of defined-contribution and defined-benefit pensions for women, 
and the impact of unisex tables in Belloni & Fornero (2008). The AIM research also confirmed that the 6 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
Pension income is thus the result of a variety of factors in pension system design and labour 
market conditions. Recent reform efforts have featured comprehensive approaches to pension 
income, going beyond microeconomic issues to draw attention to the regulation of the labour 
market. A good example is the report of the UK Pensions Commission
24 (the so-called ‘Turner 
Report’, after the Commission’s chairman, Lord Turner), which recommended: 
•  Implementing and enforcing anti-age discrimination legislation. The legislation that came 
into force in the UK in October 2006 (following a European Commission directive) makes 
age discrimination punishable if it affects workers before the statutory retirement age. 
However, beyond this mark it is possible to fire employees on the grounds of age. The 
Commission has proposed to make age discrimination completely universal. 
•  Ensuring good incentives for older workers to remain in the workforce. At present, UK 
retirees do not have the option of drawing on a part-time public pension while continuing 
working. 
•  Ensuring good financial incentives for employers to employ older workers. Here, the 
Commission proposed to consider reducing employers’ National Insurance contributions for 
old-age workers. 
•  Putting more emphasis on occupational health. 
Putting more emphasis on the education and re-training of older workers. 
Indeed, in the fight against the results of population ageing, the broader issues of old-age worker 
productivity,
25 relating to their health status and human capital, may be just as, if not more, 
important as reforms related to pensions. 
What reforms are taking place in the EU? 
Two trends are generally observable: the movement towards more defined-contribution (DC) 
formulas, and various parametric adjustments aimed at raising the effective retirement age. 
Throughout the post-war period, many pension schemes, public or private, offered defined-
benefit (DB) pensions. 
In public pension schemes, the most notable example of the shift has been the adoption of the 
notional defined contribution (NDC) formula in Sweden, which forms the backbone of the new 
Swedish system. In an NDC scheme,
26 individual accounts are credited with notional assets, 
which are given a rate of return linked to the overall economic performance of the economy. 
This principle is also used in the first pillars of the Polish and Latvian mandatory systems, and 
is being phased in (albeit over a very long period
27) in Italy.  
                                                                                                                                                            
differences in old-age income among women in a number of EU countries were due to labour market 
conditions rather than the pension system in those countries, see Kotowska, Stachura & Strzelecki (2008). 
A survey of the calculation of women’s pension rights across the EU is provided in Monticone, Ruzik & 
Skiba (2008). 
24 Pensions Commission (2006). 
25 The AIM project features an analysis by Walewski (2008). 
26 The World Bank has recently been using the term ‘non-financial defined contribution schemes’ and has 
published a book on the advantages of this approach (see Holzmann & Palmer, 2006). 
27 See Franco & Sartor (2006). HOW TO MAKE EUROPEAN PENSIONS ADEQUATE AND SUSTAINABLE? | 7 
 
Other examples of a system close to the NDC principle include ‘wage points’, as known, for 
example, in Germany and France.
28  
The shift to DC schemes is particularly notable among private pension plan sponsors, in the 
countries where private occupational pensions form an important tier of overall pension 
provision – the typical case in the EU is the UK.
29 DB schemes are being phased out fast.
30 In 
Holland, the one continental country with a really significant tier of occupational pensions, plan 
sponsors are moving towards average-pay rather than final-pay schemes.
31  
The general shift to DC schemes, in public and private plans, has been driven by two policy 
objectives. First, the need to achieve better sustainability: schemes are in principle actuarially 
neutral, so it is not possible to pay out more than what one contributed.  Secondly, a consensus 
has been building over the past years that pension systems should provide consumption 
smoothing and a basic minimum income, but should be neutral with respect to other objectives. 
Targeted assistance to vulnerable population groups should be provided via specific 
instruments.
32  
In addition, the move to DC schemes has been made possible due to technical advances. 
Countries have collected records for a sufficiently long period of time and can store and transfer 
data quickly and efficiently to make it possible to compute a pension payout based on an entire 
career, spanning several decades. 
Besides pension schemes, both public and private, moving towards being defined-contribution, 
the major shift happening in the past few years has been that governments have been busy 
closing off pathways to early retirement. Early retirement was widely instituted in the 1970s and 
1980s, when governments started to use public pension systems as a more palatable alternative 
to unemployment benefits by opening up early retirement options. Something similar happened 
in some post-communist countries (Poland being the most glaring example) in the early stages 
of economic transition.  
Over time, the danger of exposing public finances to long-term accumulation of pension 
obligations became apparent. Recently, Germany lowered the availability of early pensions and 
limited access (for example restricting it to the unemployed). Slovakia applies reductions to the 
statutory pensions of those who had taken up early retirement, and in the Netherlands the early 
pension is no longer tax-deductible.  
In addition, countries have set stricter preconditions on the contributing period (France, Greece), 
and many now apply pension premia for every year worked beyond the statutory retirement age 
(Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia and the UK).
33 
Very recently (December 2008) Poland has significantly curtailed, practically discontinued, 
early retirement. 
There have been other reforms, most notably in Finland (2005 - deep parametric reforms to 
improve sustainability),
34 Germany (most significantly in 2001 – small parametric adjustments 
                                                      
28 Legros (2006). 
29 Andrew Hill, „Farewell, defined benefits”, The Financial Times, 24 January 2009. For an early analysis 
of impact, see Ross & Wills (2002).  
30 There exists the view, however, that DB schemes are being primarily closed due to government 
overregulation and that they can be saved through better insurance policies (see Keating, 2008). 
31 See van Ewijk(2005).  
32 See Gora (2008). 
33 In the AIM project, the summary was provided in Labeaga (2006). 
34 For the analysis of economic impact, see Lassila & Valkonen (2007).  8 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
and stronger role for individual private pensions), Austria (2003 reform - little in way of novel 
mechanisms but relatively strong cuts to benefits).
35 We have already mentioned Italy, where an 
NDC system is being reluctantly introduced. These are the most publicised cases, but practically 
all governments have been making some incremental changes to improve the long-term 
sustainability of public pension systems. 
All of the post-communist member states of the EU have opted (save the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia) for very comprehensive reforms, aided by World Bank financing and technical 
advice. Public systems were split into two pillars, one remaining publicly administered, the 
other privately managed. The World Bank recipe envisioned a third pillar of voluntary, funded 
schemes, but these are very thin on the ground. Only the Czech Republic has significant 
coverage, but with low contributions and recently very low returns (with Slovakia also having a 
thin individual voluntary tier dating back to mid-1990s and Slovenia having some occupational 
schemes).
36    
The reforms in Central and Eastern Europe are such a peculiar case of a fairly uniform reform 
option with a strong regional concentration that they deserve a detailed description. 
A special case: ‘Multi-pillar reforms’ in Central and Eastern Europe 
The 1994 World Bank report Averting the Old-Age Crisis proved to be an attractive blueprint 
for introducing pension reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. As of 2009, all of the post-
communist EU members except for the Czech Republic and Slovenia have the World Bank-
recommended multi-pillar pension system (with Hungary and Poland being the first reformers, 
in 1998 and 1999 respectively, and Romania the latest, in 2007).  
The arguments in favour of carving out of the public systems a pillar with individual, privately 
managed accounts included: 1) fewer distortions to labour market incentives, 2) improved 
economic efficiency due to the fact that assets are allocated through financial markets and 3) 
insulation of the system from political meddling. 
 These arguments are not entirely convincing. As for labour market incentives, the argument is 
true to any DC system, funded or not. Regarding improvement of the performance of the stock 
market due to the inflow of pension assets and improved economic efficiency: it has to be said 
that only the Warsaw bourse has significantly benefited, due to the fact that the reform restricted 
investments out of the country to 5% of assets. Elsewhere, the pension funds started investing 
heavily in government securities. And regarding the argument that the privately managed pillar 
is automatically more stable due to the absence of government meddling, well, governments can 
actually very easily influence funds’ strategies through regulation – and if the publics become 
disenchanted with returns, they certainly will react accordingly.  
Nevertheless, for the time being, there seems to be still quite a lot of backing for the ‘second 
pillars’.
37 The advantage of this type of reform is that rather than having the inexperienced local 
political elites promoting it, it was the fund managers themselves who invested in slick, 
Western-style marketing. Also, it seems that the feeling that in the second pillar people actually 
keep owning their money rather than giving it to the government contributes to the success of 
the reform (particularly since actual payouts are still a long way off).  
                                                      
35 For a comparison of the German and Austrian reform, see Busemeyer (2005). 
36 Private schemes in the EU are the topic of a recent EC paper from the European Commission (2008). 
37  Second pillar faith not withered yet, IPE.com, 21 January 2009 (retrieved at 
http://www.ipe.com/news/Second_pillar_faith_not_withered_yet_30339.php).  HOW TO MAKE EUROPEAN PENSIONS ADEQUATE AND SUSTAINABLE? | 9 
 
The strength of faith in the funded schemes will soon be tested in Slovakia, however, where the 
government has allowed those already enrolled to opt out in the first half of 2009, ostensibly to 
allow people to reflect on their options during the financial crisis. This is the second time in the 
space of a few months that the government, has ‘re-opened’ the pillar, the previous period (the 
first half of 2008) in which an opt-out was allowed brought about an outflow of 90,000 people, 
with 1.49 million remaining in the funded pillar.
38 
Looking ahead – Myths and real policy options 
The European landscape is dominated by public PAYG systems. Even in the two European 
Union countries with traditionally strong occupational, funded pension schemes, the UK and the 
Netherlands, the PAYG component provides a substantial bulk of the pension payout in their 
basic pension tiers.  
PAYG systems sprang up everywhere throughout the 20
th century, particularly gathering 
strength after World War II, following unpleasant experiences with funded occupational 
pensions. PAYG schemes offered cheap, centralised administration and they were (and are) 
naturally insured against devastating fraud or mismanagement by the simple fact that they do 
not accumulate long-term contributions. Powered by positive demographics and steady 
productivity gains, PAYG systems became the mainstay of the post-war welfare state 
construction.  
However, the favourable productivity and demographic patterns have changed. Gradually, the 
danger of exposing public finances to long-term accumulation of pension obligations became 
apparent.  
The first reaction in the face of the looming change in the composition of the population has 
been to draw attention to the effect on public finances. This has been probably due to two 
reasons. First, it is easier to grasp the simple arithmetic represented by the ratio of contributors 
to claimants than to understand how demographics affect funded systems. Secondly, as we just 
said, PAYG systems are simply more prevalent and therefore a more obvious target. 
Some of the earlier policy documents have been blamed for unreasonably extolling the virtues 
of funded schemes, particularly the 1994 World Bank report Averting the Old-Age Crisis,
39 
which laid foundations for the reforms in the post-communist EU members, as described in the 
previous section.  
The arguments in favour of the ‘multi-pillar reforms’ have been criticised as not relying on 
robust economics.
40 These reforms entail other risks. For example losing parts of accrued rights 
when switching to the new systems: in the case of Hungary, those who switched to the system 
directly lost part of their rights.
41 Elsewhere, the need for comparatively long periods of saving 
in this system, which depended on cumulative interest, might have escaped the attention of 
                                                      
38  Druhý pilier uzatvorili. Vystúpilo 90 tisíc ľudí, SME daily, 1 July 2008 (retrieved at 
http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/3955550/druhy-pilier-uzatvorili-vystupilo-90-tisic-ludi.html).  
39 See a critical appraisal in Orszag & Stiglitz (1999). The strong promotion of funded schemes was 
criticised by the World Bank’s own evaluation group (see World Bank, 2006). For an early discussion of 
reform trends in the CEECs, see Fultz (2003). 
40 Besides the critical reports of Stiglitz & Orszag, op. cit., the issue of pension myths and policy choices 
is widely discussed in Barr (2000), and revisited in Barr (2006). A defene of public systems is made in 
Diamond (1998). 
41 See Augusztinovics (2007). 10 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
those who signed up, even though they had very short periods to retirement.
42 One might also 
consider wider political economy risks of having, in some cases, very few funds accumulating a 
substantial share of GDP. And, last but not least, the governance risks: in general the reformers 
have been careful to introduce comprehensive safeguards, such as the separation of the fund’s 
assets from the management firm’s assets, oversight requirements for account custodians 
(banks) and penalties for funds significantly deviating from average market returns. However, 
funded schemes still carry some governance risks, which should be analysed and appropriately 
regulated.
43 
The example of the Central and Eastern European states illustrates the need to tread carefully. 
The bold reforms may turn out to have been, in general, a good step, but there are many 
problem points, aside from the fact that in these states, crucial pieces of legislation (e.g. details 
on annuitisation of contributions) are still missing. 
The post-communist countries’ and the Swedish example show, nevertheless, that ‘reform 
bundling’ rather than parametric adjustment is often the more viable reform strategy.
44 Single, 
headline adjustments often lead to resistance, while reform packages make it possible to address 
the concerns of a large spectrum of stakeholders. Successful reforms thus need careful mapping 
of attitudes to reform options
45 and detailed designs to spread the cost of reforms in a politically 
expedient way, preferably evenly over cohorts.
46  
Conclusion 
The demands of voters to be taken care of in the later stages of life will not go away. Neither 
will the promises of politicians to provide or mandate such care. What economists must do is 
continue pointing out where adjustments are needed. They also need to chart out, whenever 
possible, a range of reform options. Politicians must be provided with a choice, so that they can 
opt for the solution best suited to a particular constellation of stakeholders.  
Furthermore, while a sound economic analysis of sustainability and adequacy is a key condition, 
other issues need to be taken into consideration, particularly management risks related to 
pension funds.  
Europe does not have to face a pension crisis. Reforms are clearly possible, as several examples 
in the EU have shown. Governments must act quickly – but also effectively. If a pension system 
does not work, the voters will demand change. No publicly mandated system, whether it is 
PAYG or funded, publicly or privately managed, is immune to political meddling. Policy-
makers should therefore strive for solutions that are sustainable both economically and 
politically. Academia has certainly provided them with a lot of tools to assist their deliberations.   
                                                      
42 The need to help those with such extremely short saving periods to re-think decisions was one of the 
main arguments given by the Slovak government when it allowed opt-outs in 2008 and the outflow was, 
indeed, mostly in the category of older workers, see Druhý pilier opustilo viac ľudí, ako sa očakávalo, 
SME daily, 13 May 2008 (retrieved at http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/3873955/Druhy-pilier-opustilo-viac-
ludi-ako-sa-ocakavalo.html).  
43 For a summary of regulatory issues, see Yermo (2005). See also Besley & Prat (2003) for differences in 
governance of DB and DC schemes. 
44 On ‘reform bundling’ and multi-pillar reforms, see Müller (2003). 
45 For a detailed analysis, see the following AIM study: Janky & Gal (2008). 
46 See Myles (2002), “A new social contract for the elderly?”, in G. Esping-Andersen, D. Gallie, A. 
Hemerijck and J. Myles (eds), Why We Need a New Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press. HOW TO MAKE EUROPEAN PENSIONS ADEQUATE AND SUSTAINABLE? | 11 
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